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THE LNT DEBATE IN RADIATION PROTECTION: SCIENCE VS. POLICY

Kenneth L. Mossman

䊐

Arizona State University

䊐 There is considerable interest in revisiting LNT theory as the basis for the system of
radiation protection in the US and worldwide. Arguing the scientific merits of policy
options is not likely to be fruitful because the science is not robust enough to support one
theory to the exclusion of others. Current science cannot determine the existence of a
dose threshold, a key piece to resolving the matter scientifically. The nature of the scientific evidence is such that risk assessment at small effective doses (defined as <100 mSv) is
highly uncertain, and several policy alternatives, including threshold and non-linear doseresponse functions, are scientifically defensible. This paper argues for an alternative
approach by looking at the LNT debate as a policy question and analyzes the problem
from a social and economic perspective. In other words, risk assessment and a strictly scientific perspective are insufficiently broad enough to resolve the issue completely. A wider
perspective encompassing social and economic impacts in a risk management context is
necessary, but moving the debate to the policy and risk management arena necessarily
marginalizes the role of scientists.
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INTRODUCTION

Protection of workers and the public from ionizing radiation exposure is based on the assumption that cancer incidence or mortality risk is
a linear function of radiation dose, and any dose of radiation, no matter
how small, may cause cancer. The linear no-threshold (LNT) theory
serves as the philosophical and practical foundation for risk assessment
and management of exposures in the environment and workplace.
Standard-setting organizations such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (U.S. NRC) and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) rely on independent authoritative bodies to provide analyses and
evaluations of scientific evidence in support of their standard setting policies. The U.S. NRC and EPA rely on the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) and the National Academies for
such advice. In a 2001 report NCRP concluded the LNT theory is the
most appropriate theory for radiological risk assessment because the
available scientific data did not overwhelmingly support an alternative
theory. The National Academies in its 2005 BEIR VII report drew similar
conclusions. EPA and U.S. NRC continue to use LNT theory in risk assess-
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ment in accordance with the position that other theories are not more
plausible (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
2001; National Research Council 2005).
LNT theory provides a conservative estimate of cancer risk at low
doses, and it is easily communicated and understood by policymakers and
the public. But the notion that any dose may be harmful and that no dose
is safe leads to a regulatory framework and philosophy characterized by
public fear and increasing regulatory compliance costs (Mossman 2006).
There is now considerable interest in revisiting LNT theory as a scientific basis for radiation protection practice. In 1989 Sagan suggested a
reexamination of the scientific evidence in support of LNT because the
evidence for hormesis (i.e., biphasic) and other nonlinear dose-response
functions appeared to be considerable and deserved more serious attention (Sagan 1989). The nature of the scientific evidence is such that risk
assessment at small effective doses (defined as <100 mSv) is highly uncertain, and several policy alternatives, including non-linear dose-response
functions, are scientifically defensible. Estimates of cancer incidence and
mortality due to small effective doses depend on the choice of predictive
theory. In spite of significant gains in our understanding of the processes
of carcinogenesis, there remains no adequate model of carcinogenesis
that permits derivation of a predictive theory from first principles.
This paper argues for an alternative path to resolving the LNT policy
conundrum. Continuing the debate on a scientific basis is not likely to be
fruitful because the science is not robust enough to support one theory
to the exclusion of others. Current science cannot determine the existence of a dose threshold, a key piece to resolving the matter scientifically (National Research Council 2005, Puskin 2009). An alternative
approach is to look at the LNT debate as a policy question and analyze
the problem from a social and economic perspective. In other words, risk
assessment is insufficiently broad enough to resolve the issue completely.
A wider perspective encompassing social and economic impacts is necessary, but moving the debate to the policy and risk management arena necessarily marginalizes the role of scientists.
The argument for a policy solution is based on the following themes
that are discussed more fully in the remainder of the paper:
Science and policy address different questions. Science cannot
address all policy-relevant questions.
Defensible science alone is not sufficient to establish policy (but indefensible science is sufficient to reject policy).
Science does not usually drive policy
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The LNT debate is being played out entirely in the science arena with
the view that science should drive policy choices. There has been little discussion of the economic, political and social dimensions of policy making. Individuals and groups of scientists tend to promote particular policy choices based on available scientific evidence. Some are proponents of
linearity; others believe a threshold or nonlinearity (including a biphasic
dose-response) is more scientifically-defensible. The controversy has been
ongoing for years and raises questions of the role of science and the scientific community in policy deliberations. Battles waged only in the scientific arena will not resolve fully the policy question because scientific
data and their associated uncertainties are only part of the problem. The
implications of a conservative, LNT approach is a higher degree of safety
but costs of managing small doses can be enormously expensive (Breyer
1993). A less conservative policy would reduce regulatory costs considerably (Mossman 2009).
Risk assessment (science) and risk management (policy) ask different
questions (Table 1). Risk assessment focuses on identifying the hazardous
agent and the at-risk populations, the likely exposures, and the consequences of exposure (including public health and environmental effects,
severity, magnitude, variability and uncertainties). Risk assessment information is provided to decision-makers and risk managers concerned with
feasibility of risk reduction, and costs and benefits of interventions including economic, social, political and cultural impacts. The failure to uncouple risk assessment from risk management has made it difficult to resolve
the LNT question completely. Assessment and management of risks
should be clearly separated processes. Risk assessment is a purely scientific and technical effort, and terminates with a quantification of the risk. It
is the role of the risk manager to manage the risk that the risk assessor has
quantified. Risk management involves decision making and the taking of
action. Thus, the matter of preferences, values, policies and decision making belongs within the framework of risk management, not risk assessment
(Mossman 2009). The National Research Council has been a strong proponent of the separation of policy/value judgments that are cornerstones
of risk management from the scientific and technical aspects of risk assessment (National Research Council 1983, 1994, 2007).
TABLE 1. Science and policy focus on different questions
Science ( Risk Assessment)

Policy (Risk Management)

1. What can go wrong?

1. What are the risks posed by human activities and
natural phenomena on society and the environment?
2. Are these risks acceptable?
3. Can these risks be reduced?
4. On what basis should we choose among these options?
5. How confident are we about our analyses?

2. How likely is it to happen?
3. What are the consequences?
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The fundamental issue is the failure to recognize the limits of science
in decision-making. The process of making sound decisions is based on a
careful consideration of all scientific and non-scientific dimensions of the
problem including economics, cultural and social issues, politics and values (Pielke 2007). Many of the issues that lie at the interface between science and policy involve questions that can be stated in scientific terms but
are in principle beyond the proficiency of science to answer. Weinberg
coined the word “trans-scientific” to describe these types of problems. He
argues that for problems attended by large uncertainty or having strong
political overtones such as health risks of low doses of ionizing radiation
adequate solutions cannot be supplied by science alone (Weinberg 1972).
A SCIENCE (RISK ASSESSMENT) PERSPECTIVE

In an idealistic world scientific evidence in support of a particular theory is unequivocal and a path forward to establishing policy is clear. The
scientific evidence is robust enough to support one policy to the exclusion of alternative policy choices. Unfortunately in the real world this is
not the case. Scientific evidence is not unequivocal and several policy
options are scientifically defensible. The way forward is not clear cut.
Uncertainty in the science makes policy choices difficult (Pielke 2007).
Radiogenic risk assessment is a complex process because risk information cannot be measured directly. Direct observations of radiogenic
health effects are observed at doses 2-3 orders of magnitude higher that
typically encountered in environmental and occupational settings. To
predict the magnitude of health risks necessitates the use of predictive
theories involving questionable assumptions. For example the assumption of no repair of biological injury in LNT theory is known to be untenable (Mossman 2006). Dose and dose-rate effectiveness factors (DDREF)
are used to adjust LNT-derived risk coefficients to account for biological
repair. The extent of repair is an important determinant of risk. DDREF
values are not known very well and values close to unity are typically used
to estimate risk conservatively. The usefulness of risk assessment for decision making is limited by the extent of uncertainty in the analysis.
Estimation of low-dose radiation risk is associated with uncertainties
in measurement of risks and uncertainty inherent to modeling complex
biological systems. There is little epidemiological evidence to support statistically significant radiogenic risks below 100 mSv (National Research
Council 2005, Mossman 2006, Puskin 2009). The major source of risk
data used in radiation protection is the Japanese Life Span Study (LSS).
The LSS has been going on for more than 50 years involving about 85,000
Japanese survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945 (Preston et al. 2003). Although cancer risks are derived primarily
from those survivors exposed to high doses (>500 mSv) in reality the LSS
is really a low dose study. Over 85% of the subjects (including controls)
193
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were exposed to doses below 200 mSv. The number of excess cancers
attributable to radiation exposure in the <200 mSv group (the difference
in cancer deaths between exposed and unexposed groups) is within random statistical error. Only at higher doses are the excess cancer deaths
large enough relative to the number of subjects exposed to result in statistically significant risk. The fact that risks cannot be detected at statistically significant levels at doses below 200 mSv does not discount the value
of the low dose data (Mossman 2006).
The LSS makes a clear statement that at low doses (<200 mSv) radiogenic cancer risk cannot be measured. It is unclear from the data
whether the risk is zero or too small to be measured reliably. The inability to measure risk cannot be used as evidence to support the existence of
a threshold. To do so would require clear evidence of absence of risk.
If no one in the LSS was exposed to doses above 200 mSv there would
be little evidence to support cancer as the major health effect of exposure
at low doses. It is interesting to speculate how risk estimates, regulations
and the framework for radiation protection might have evolved without
the key epidemiological data above 200 mSv. It is safe to conclude that
cancer would have ultimately been identified as an important health outcome at low doses because of experimental animal studies and also from
studies of radiotherapy patients. Although radiotherapy involves very
high doses to localized diseased areas, tissues outside of the treatment volume get a small measurable dose that increases cancer risk. Radiotherapy
doses depend on tumor site and are typically in the range of 40 Gy to 70
Gy1. Normal tissues surrounding the tumor may receive scatter doses
about 1% of the total tumor dose or about 0.5 Gy. This scattered dose is
high enough to increase risks of second cancers particularly in children
and young adults. Risks of second cancers have been used to corroborate
the risk estimates derived from the LSS (Hall and Giaccia 2006).
The lack of power in epidemiological studies to detect significant
radiogenic risks at low doses is due to the low signal (the radiogenic cancer risk) and high noise (high natural or spontaneous cancer risk) characteristic of human populations. Power is the probability of detecting an
effect when the effect is present, The ratio of the “signal” to the “noise”
determines the size of the population needed to detect risk at a given
radiation dose. Huge populations are needed because the signal to noise
ratio is very low (only about 2% at 100 mSv). A population of about 1 billion persons (roughly one-sixth of the world’s population) would be
required to detect a cancer risk from natural background radiation exposure (assumed to be about 1 mSv per year excluding contributions from
radon) if such a risk actually existed. A population of about 10 million
1

The gray (Gy) is the unit of absorbed dose. For x and gamma rays, the Gy and Sv are
numerically equivalent: 1 Gy= 1 Sv= 1 J/kg.
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would be needed to detect an elevated cancer risk in a population
exposed to a dose of 10 mSv (the approximate dose of some medical
radiodiagnostic procedures). As a general rule the population size needed to detect a risk with 95% confidence is inversely related to the square
of the average population dose. If the average dose to the population is
increased tenfold, the population size needed to detect a risk is reduced
by a factor of 100.
Uncertainties in risk measurements at low dose can be reduced but
not eliminated by using large study populations but this is impractical.
Important additional information about risk might be obtained through
study of patients receiving fractionated or chronic exposures, or studies
of cohorts receiving chronic radiation exposures, either environmentally
or occupationally (Puskin 2008).
Another source of uncertainty derives from the biological complexity
of cancer. LNT and other dose-response options in radiation protection
describe the relation between radiation dose and cancer incidence or
mortality. The complex processes in cancer pathogenesis cannot be
understood by analysis of dose-response curves. In view of the low-dose
limitations of epidemiologic studies, biophysical studies at the cellular
and sub-cellular levels have been used to better understand the shape of
the dose-response curve at small doses (Brenner and Raabe 2001, Puskin
2009, Ulsh 2010). Cellular and sub-cellular studies have been important
in understanding initiation and promotional events in carcinogenesis but
reductionist approaches have serious limitations because they focus on
the elements of the system rather than on the system as a whole. Cancer
is more than a collection of abnormal cells. Tumor behavior and cancer
risk cannot be predicted by studying individual cells.
Recently a system biology perspective has emerged as a way of looking
at carcinogenesis. Through this lens tumors are viewed as complex selfassembled systems embedded in the larger complex system of the human
body. The idea of a systems approach evolved from the growing understanding that cancer genes have important regulatory functions involving
numerous gene regulatory networks. For example the Myc proto-oncogene
subnetwork is a central regulatory system in the cell. The Myc proto-oncogene is a transcription factor that regulates expression of 15% of all genes.
When it is mutated cancer results (Basso 2005). At the level of the cell, perturbations at one point in the gene regulatory network can have a rippling
effect at other points in the network. Tumor cells have the capacity to communicate with each other and develop substances including angiogenesis
factors for the benefit of the growing tumor (Kleinsmith 2006).
Reductionist approaches are not likely to be fruitful in clarifying the
magnitude of risk at low doses because cancer is a complex disease and
cellular changes do not necessarily translate into cancer mortality.
Cellular and molecular events may be too far removed mechanistically to
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https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dose_response/vol10/iss2/6

6

Mossman: THE LNT DEBATE IN RADIATION PROTECTION: SCIENCE VS. POLICY

K. L. Mossman

have utility for predicting cancer risk (Ulsh 2010). The U.S. Courts recognize the difficulties linking cancer risk with cell injury. In Dumontier et
al. v. Schlumberger Tech (2007) plaintiffs, claiming exposure to Cs-137 radiation exposure caused sub-cellular injury including DNA damage, sued
even though there was no evidence of cancer. On appeal the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Montana District Court decision in
favor of Defendant arguing that cell damage does not necessarily lead to
bodily injury. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review.
The presence of small numbers of cancer cells does not necessarily
mean a tumor will develop. Radiation carcinogenesis is a stochastic
process. The dose of radiation determines the probability a radiogenic
cancer will occur, not the severity of disease (National Research Council
2005; Mossman 2006). Tumors that begin to grow may stop growing for
no apparent reason. Pseudo-disease is well documented in breast cancer
and prostate cancer (Welch 2004). The detection of in situ lesions often
lead to diagnosis of cancer, and the patient is treated even though these
very small tumors were never destined to grow and require medical management. In cancer diagnosis it is often difficult to identify which cancers
require medical attention and which ones are pseudo-disease and do not
require medical intervention. This is a well known problem in breast and
prostate cancer screening. Most ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS) represents pseudo-disease of the breast and is not likely to progress to invasive
disease. Approximately 50-70% of DCIS does not contribute to breast cancer risk (Welch and Black 1997, Welch 2004, Esserman et al. 2009).
Scientific efforts to resolve the shape of the dose-response curve at low
doses have met with limited success in spite of significant advances in our
understanding of the biology and clinical characteristics of cancer.
Whether science will ever be able to resolve the LNT question is debatable.
Without robust scientific and epidemiologic evidence at doses below 100
mSv a scientific confirmation of the LNT theory will remain out of reach.
A POLICY (RISK MANAGEMENT) PERPECTIVE

Policy decision-making is complex when scientific evidence does not
provide a clear decision path and stakeholders hold different values
regarding alternatives. Economic, political and social factors can trump
scientific considerations. The theory that best fits the scientific data may
not be the theory of political choice. Science is an important component
in decision-making, but it is not necessarily the key driver in the process
(Pielke 2007).
The goal of risk management is to reduce risk. In practice it is the
dose of the agent that is controlled, not the risk itself. The underlying
assumption in risk management is that reduction of dose leads to a concomitant reduction in risk. Unfortunately there is little direct evidence to
support this assumption from epidemiological studies in occupational
196
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and environmental settings. In reality, the number of cancers averted for
a given diminution in dose cannot be observed directly because risks are
very small to begin with. Instead the number of cancer deaths averted is
calculated based on a theoretically determined reduction in risk.
Depending on the shape of the true dose-response curve, there may be
little if any real change in risk when dose is reduced (Mossman 2006).
Several options are available to the decision-maker and risk manager
to control risk. A strictly precautionary approach can be used to eliminate
or avoid the risk entirely. This strategy puts heavy weight on risk reduction at high social costs. A goal to eliminate risks entirely may mean abandoning the technology altogether. More moderate approaches include
avoiding unacceptable risks or costs and balancing risks and benefits. An
unacceptable risk strategy gives weight to protecting the public health
and environment at the expense of monetary and other costs of protection. In a management strategy to avoid unacceptable costs, limited
resources are conserved at the expense of public health and environmental harms. A combination strategy seeks to balance costs and benefits
(Coglianese and Marchant 2004).
Radiation protection has adopted universally a cost-benefit strategy in
the form of an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) risk management philosophy. Under ALARA dose is reduced to levels as low as reasonably achievable below established dose limits given economic and
social constraints (Mossman 2006). Under LNT theory and other monotonic dose-response functions reducing dose leads to a concomitant
reduction in radiogenic risk. Reducing the dose to zero has the effect of
eliminating the radiogenic risk. Implementation of ALARA is more complex however when considering non-monotonic functions such as the
hormetic biphasic dose-response. A biphasic dose-response is characterized by a threshold dose below which the dose-response function is Ushaped. Reduction of dose below the threshold leads to beneficial effects
(i.e., cancer incidence in the population is reduced). From a risk management perspective it is unclear how an ALARA program should be
implemented when beneficial effects of radiation at sub-threshold doses
are considered. The goal of any radiation risk management program
including ALARA is to reduce radiogenic effects by managing radiation
dose to the extent practicable given social and economic constraints.
Risk management is not a strictly scientific or engineering exercise.
Social, political and economic considerations are keys to determining
what is or should be achievable. Even though a dose is below the regulatory limit should it be reduced further? If so, what are the economic,
political and social consequences of further risk reduction? Is there sufficient scientific evidence to suggest that reducing risk will result in a public health benefit? Should risks be reduced solely because we have the
technical means to do so?
197
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There is little argument that US radiation protection has been successful in protecting nuclear workers and the public from radiation exposure.
But economic costs of risk management are considerable and raise serious
questions about whether limited resources are being allocated optimally to
address public health and environmental problems. One issue is LNT theory is used to justify dose reduction to levels at or close to zero above natural background based on the idea that no dose is acceptable. As doses
approach natural background levels costs of further reductions become
considerable. It is unclear these near-background dose diminutions provide concomitant public health or environmental benefits.
Cleanup of the Uravan Uranium site in Montrose County, Colorado
illustrates how misinterpretation of the LNT theory can lead to excessive
environmental cleanup costs. The 680-acre Uravan Uranium site began as
a radium-recovery plant in 1912. From the 1940s to 1984, the plant operated as a uranium and vanadium processing facility. Operations left a
large volume of waste, contaminating air, soil and groundwater near the
plant. The EPA added the site to its National Priorities List in 1986, and
the State of Colorado led the environmental cleanup effort. About $127
million was spent from 1986 to 2008 to remove radioactive contamination
from the site. At the close of the remediation project, residual radiation
doses to hypothetical members of the public on the site approximated
0.02 mSv/y above natural background. Cleanup essentially returned the
site to pristine conditions (Environmental Protection Agency 2008). But
the public health benefits of the cleanup are unclear. An epidemiological
study of the entire Uravan population from 1936-1984 showed no measurable public health effects of environmental radiation exposure. The
overall Uravan mortality rate was 10% lower than the national average.
Only an excess of lung cancer mortality in occupationally exposed uranium miners was observed and was attributable to high radon concentrations in the mines and cigarette smoking (Boice et al. 2007).
A 2000 study of US nuclear standards compared costs of soil cleanup
at selected nuclear sites to achieve different soil cleanup levels (Table 2).
Costs increased exponentially as cleanup levels become more restrictive.
Cost differences among sites reflect site-specific differences including soil
and building contamination and waste disposal options (General
Accounting Office 2000).
TABLE 2. Estimated costs to achieve different soil cleanup levels at selected nuclear sites (General
Accounting Office 2000)
Site
Nevada Test Site 1995
Brookhaven National Laboratory Waste Facility 1998
Nuclear power plant 1997

to 1 mSv

to 0.25 mSv

to 0.1 mSv

$35 million
$16 million
$0.17 million

$131 million
$24 million
$0.3 million

$1 billion
$64 million
$1.4 million
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Ratcheting doses downward eventually leads to a point of diminishing
marginal returns in public health and environmental benefits (Breyer
1993). At what point does the cost of further dose reduction exceed
derived benefits in terms of public health and environmental protection?
LNT theory puts no lower bound on dose.
The idea that any dose is potentially harmful under LNT theory has
also led to unwarranted fears about radiation. In one survey of primary
care physicians in Pennsylvania, 59% of doctors identified fear of radiation as a major reason for their patients’ refusal of mammography examinations. Fear of radiation-induced cancer or other health effects is one
of several factors that might be considered by individuals who decline
medical x-ray procedures. In the Pennsylvania study cost was also identified as a key factor why mammography was declined (Albanes et al. 1988).
Women who refuse mammography may be denying themselves a key
medical benefit by compromising early detection and the subsequent
management of disease.
Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, an estimated 100,000200,000 Chernobyl-related induced abortions were performed in
Western Europe. Radioactive fallout from the accident was widespread in
Europe. Adults, pregnant women and children were exposed by ingesting
contaminated foods. Fear of radiation injury was particularly acute
among pregnant women. Perceptions of radiation risks affected personal
choices about continuing pregnancies. In Greece, as in other parts of
Europe, many obstetricians initially thought it prudent to interrupt otherwise wanted pregnancies or were unable to resist requests from worried
pregnant women in spite of the fact that the abortions were unwarranted
because radiation doses were much lower than necessary to produce in
utero effects (Trichopoulos et al. 1987).
THE POLICY-SCIENCE DYNAMIC

Science usually does not drive policy because scientific evidence is
generally not convincing enough to support one policy option to the
exclusion of alternatives. But science should provide policy makers with
confident predictions of outcomes of distinct policy choices, which can
then serve as the basis for informed decisions. Biological complexity however makes this difficult. Predicting health effects involves deep uncertainty because of the inherent complexity of cancer as a disease process
and the difficulties in measuring very small risks.
It is unlikely LNT theory will be abandoned as the philosophical and
practical foundation of radiation protection practice unless society
decides that economic costs of current protection practices are unacceptably high and using a less conservative approach would not compromise
the public health or environment. A philosophical shift to a less conservative policy would likely gain traction if clear evidence of a dose threshold
199
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can be established. However, current epidemiological evidence can neither confirm nor eliminate the existence of a dose threshold (National
Research Council 2005). There is scientific and epidemiological evidence
in support of nonlinear theories but LNT theory remains the default
option because countervailing evidence is not compelling (National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 2001). A practical
threshold may exist if actual risks are substantially below those projected
by LNT theory. Radiogenic risks at or close to zero may be considered negligible from a regulatory perspective. However adoption of a practical
threshold for radiation protection purposes would almost certainly
require epidemiological confirmation. A threshold level substantially
above natural background levels might allow for relaxation of certain regulations like those associated with environmental cleanup. A threshold
level below natural background would have no impact. Regulatory agencies like the EPA would be expected to move cautiously on the question of
a policy change, and only on the basis of strong recommendations from
internal and external advisory bodies. (Puskin 2009).
The existence of a threshold would likely impact radiation protection
practice under the ALARA standard. Under LNT theory the ALARA dose
floor is zero if LNT theory is interpreted to mean there is a non-zero risk
at any dose. Radiation dose above natural background is reduced to the
extent practicable given social and economic constraints under ALARA.
In theory if resources are unlimited all dose above background should be
eliminated. In practice resources are not unlimited and not all doses can
be eliminated. An ALARA practice is considered satisfactory if the residual risk is deemed acceptable. If there is a dose threshold the dose floor
is elevated to the threshold. In that case the balancing of costs against
benefits to meet the ALARA standard terminates at the threshold dose
floor. Expending resources to reduce dose further would be of no benefit and would be counter to the ALARA philosophy.
From a policy perspective LNT is on soft ground. The idea that any
dose may be harmful and that no dose is considered safe has lead to a regulatory framework and philosophy characterized by public fear and
increasing regulatory compliance costs. One concern is that valuable
resources are allocated to progressively reduce doses to levels that provide
no further public health or environmental protection. It seems prudent
and reasonable to replace LNT theory with a less conservative, scientifically defensible dose-response policy if doing so reduces economic and
social costs without compromising the protection of the public health
and environment.
What would it take to demonstrate the cost-benefit advantage of a policy change? Assuming no change in worker or environmental dose limits,
a scientifically defensible, nonlinear dose response would allow for less
conservative ALARA practices as discussed above. Benefits in terms of
200
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reduced compliance costs to realize higher residual risks can be quantified (Table 2), but measuring harms in terms of a reduction in public
health and environmental protection would be very difficult. Radiogenic
risks at doses near natural background levels cannot be measured reliably
(National Research Council 2005). Because of the inherent difficulties
and uncertainties in risk estimation small increases or decreases in dose
are not likely to result in measurable changes in public health and environmental protection. That does not mean risks have not changed but if
they have the change is too small to measure. Absence of evidence of benefit is not evidence of absence of benefit.
CONCLUSIONS

There is considerable interest in revisiting LNT theory as a scientific
basis for radiation protection practice. But, arguing the scientific merits
of policy options is not likely to be fruitful because the science is not
robust enough to support one theory to the exclusion of others. The
nature of the scientific evidence is such that risk assessment at small effective doses (defined as <100 mSv) is highly uncertain, and several policy
alternatives, including threshold and non-linear dose-response functions,
are scientifically defensible. This paper argues for an alternative
approach by looking at the LNT debate as a policy question and analyzes
the problem from a social and economic perspective. It is unlikely LNT
theory will be abandoned as the philosophical and practical foundation
of radiation protection practice unless society decides that economic and
social costs of current protection practices are unacceptable and using a
less conservative approach would not compromise the public health or
environment. A philosophical shift to a less conservative policy would
likely gain traction if clear evidence of a dose threshold can be established. However, current epidemiological evidence can neither confirm
nor eliminate the existence of a dose threshold.
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